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Abstract
This paper studies oligopolistic competition in education markets when schools can be
private and public and when the quality of education depends on peer groupe¤ects.
In the rst stage of our game schools set their quality and in the second stage they x
their tuition fees. We examine how the (subgame perfect Nash) equilibrium allocation
(qualities, tuition fees and welfare) is a¤ected by the presence of public schools and
by their relative position in the quality range. When there are no peer group e¤ects,
e¢ ciency is achieved when (at least) all but one school are public. In particular in the
two school case, the impact of a public school is spectacular as we go from a setting
of extreme di¤erentiation to an e¢ cient allocation. However, in the three school case,
a single public school will lower welfare compared to the private equilibrium. We then
introduce a peer group e¤ect which, for any given school is determined by its student
with the highest ability. These PGE do have a signicant impact on the results. The
mixed equilibrium is now never e¢ cient. However, welfare continues to be improved if
all but one school are public. Overall, the presence of PGE reduces the e¤ectiveness of
public schools as regulatory tool in an otherwise private education sector.
Keywords: Education, peer-group e¤ects, mixed duopoly
JEL-Classication: I2, L33
1 Introduction
This paper studies oligopolistic competition in education markets when education providers
can be private and public and when the quality of educational achievement is jointly
determined by the use of costly (private) inputs and by a school specic peer group ef-
fect(PGE). These di¤erent building blocks appear to represent realistic features of the
education sector. In most countries there are public and private providers and there is
some competition in the education market. Furthermore, the quality of the peer group
seems to be an important determinant of education quality. Our concern is about the
conguration of the market (size and locationof schools) and the e¤ect of competition
on human capital formation and distribution. There are other possible objectives with
we leave for future research such as the e¤ect on income distribution.
Our paper brings together three subjects, which are central to the economics of
education but have not been considered simultaneously. These issues have been studied
separately, either in other education related settings or for di¤erent markets altogether.
The main point we make is that these features interact and that putting them together
leads to conclusions which cannot be understood by analyzing them separately.
First, our paper is related to the issue of competition between schools under al-
ternative assumptions pertaining to the objective functions of schools and education
outcomes. This subject has been examined by a number of authors, including Boadway,
Marchand and Marceau (1996), De Fraja and Valbonesi (2012), De Fraja and Iossa
(2002), MacLeod and Urquiola (2010) and Maldonado (2008). In particular these pa-
pers examine how the schoolsobjective (e.g., maximizing prestige, welfare or prots)
and/or the presence of competition a¤ects education outcomes. When competition is
considered, all schools have the same objective. This brings us to the second subject
covered by our paper namely that of mixed markets, i.e., markets where competing
schools have di¤erent objectives. Empirically, this is a widespread phenomena; see for
instance Cellini and Goldin (2012) and Deming et al. (2012). These papers show that
US education markets are e¤ectively mixed. In particular, for-prot and non-for-prot
universities coexist and, moreover, the proportion of for-prot universities has been
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steadily rising in the last decades.1 Mixed markets in general have been studied for
instance by Cremer, Marchand and Thisse (1991), while applications to the education
markets have been examined by Brunello and Rocco (2008) and Romero and Del Rey
(2004).
Finally, our paper also relates to the literature on the education production and the
importance on the peer group e¤ect on education quality. The empirical relevance of
the peer group e¤ect has been considered extensively by the empirical literature. The
list of articles addressing this issue is long, some important references are Summers
and Wolfe, (1977), Mayer and Jencks (1989), Evans, Oates and Schwab, (1992), Pong
(1998), Hoxby (2000), Gaviria and Raphael (2001), Sacerdote, (2001), Hanushek (2003),
Zimmerman (2003), Robertson and Symons (2003), Angrist and Lang (2004), Foster
(2006), Bonesrønning (2008). The literature discusses the size, the form (linear or non-
linear), the relevant variables (socioeconomic status of families of peers vs. GPA or the
behavior of peers), and the outcomes that may be a¤ected by the peer group e¤ ect
(GPA, pregnancy rates, drug consumption, etc.).
In general these articles show that the peer group e¤ect exists although some of
them argue that it may be modest. The size or the importance of the peer group e¤ect
is not a concern for this paper since our objective is not to discuss policy issues but to
discuss the e¤ect of the existence of the peer group e¤ect on school market conguration.
Among this articles there is a group that discusses the form of the peer group e¤ect and
show that the peer group e¤ect is not of the linear-in-means form; this is particularly
important for our model since we will follow these articles in the way we model the peer
group e¤ect.
The implications of the peer group e¤ect have also been considered by the theo-
retical literature. Most of the literature has concentrated on the implications of peer
group e¤ects on sorting and inequality (Bartolome, 1990 and Benabou, 1996), market
e¢ ciency and tuition fees (Epple and Romano, 1998) and the use of di¤erent types of
policies like the presence of public schools vs. vouchers (Caucutt, 2002). Epple and
1These papers also show that for-prot universities have educacional outcomes that di¤er from those
of other types of universities.
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Romano (1998) and Caucutt (2002) are closest to our paper in spirit although. How-
ever, there are signicant di¤erences with our paper, and particularly the underlying
type of competition. Both papers assume a large number of private schools which, in
the absence of public schools, leads to perfect competition. In addition they do not
account for strategic behavior of public schools which is of course a major ingredient in
our oligopoly setting.2
In this paper we study mixed oligopoly equilibria in two- and three- schools settings
allowing for di¤erent possible congurations regarding the number of public schools and
their location. Private schools maximize prots and public schools maximize welfare.
We consider a two stage game of which we determine the subgame perfect Nash equilib-
rium. In the rst stage schools (simultaneously) set their quality and in the second stage
they (simultaneously) x their tuition fees. We examine how the equilibrium allocation
(qualities, tuition fees and welfare) is a¤ected by the presence of public schools and by
their relative position in the quality range. To set a benchmark, we rst consider a
setting without peer group e¤ects. Then we introduce peer group e¤ects and reexam-
ine the impact of public schools in this context. The peer group e¤ect for any given
school is determined by its student with the highest ability. Interestingly, the optimal
allocation is una¤ected by the presence of peer group e¤ects. They do however, have a
signicant e¤ect on the various equilibria we consider. When there are no peer group
e¤ects, e¢ ciency is achieved when (at least) all but one school are public. In particular
in the two school case, the impact of a public school is spectacular as we go from a
setting of extreme di¤erentiation to an e¢ cient allocation. However, in the three school
case, a single public school will lower welfare compared to the private equilibrium. Re-
sults turn out to be more complex (and less spectacular) when there are peer groups
e¤ects. In that case the mixed equilibrium is never e¢ cient. However, welfare continues
to be improved if all but one school are public. Overall, the presence of PGE reduces
the e¤ectiveness of public schools as regulatory tool in an otherwise private education
sector. This may come as a surprise because PGE generate externalities which could
be expected to enhance the case for public intervention. However, an e¤ective public
2The behavioral foundations of PGE have been studied by Lazear (2001).
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intervention has to rely on the appropriate instrument(s). And the lesson that emerges
from our result is that the mere presence of public (welfare maximizing) schools may not
be su¢ cient. As a matter of fact, in the absence of commitment, they may e¤ectively
be detrimental to social welfare. While this phenomenon can also occur in the absence
of PGE, it appears to be exacerbated by the PGE. We rst show that the peer group
e¤ects may be responsible for the asymmetry of the market. Second, we show that while
without peer group e¤ects the presence of public schools may restore e¢ ciency, when
there are peer group e¤ects this is never the case. Finally we show that the optimal
location of public schools di¤ers according to whether there are peer group e¤ects or
not.
This paper is organized as follows. Section 2 introduces the model and presents the
e¢ cient allocation. Section 3 studies the case without peer group e¤ects, while peer
group e¤ects are introduced in Section 4.
2 The Model
Consider a continuum of individuals with ability a distributed uniformly over [a; a],
where 0  a < a, and a nite number of schools, S, indexed by i. An individual of
ability a who attends a school of quality qi with a peer group e¤ect gi will realize a
labor income y(a; qi; gi) which is dened by
y(a; qi; gi) = (1 + a)qi + gi;
where   0 measure the intensity of the PGE. Utility depends on consumption which
equals labor income minus tuition fees. The utility of a student of ability a who attends
school s is specied by
u(a; qi; gi; ti) = U + y(a; qi; gi)  ti;
where U is a constant su¢ ciently large to assume that the market is covered in all the
relevant equilibria.
Students attend the school providing them with the highest utility. The marginal
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student who is indi¤erent between attending school r and school s, is given by
asr =
(ts   tr)  (gs   gr)
qs   qr   1; (1)
as long as this level belongs to [a; a]. Otherwise we have a corner solution where one
of the schools is not active. For notational convenience all analytical expression as-
sume that marginal students are interior; however, the possibility of corner solutions is
explicitly accounted for in all the numerical examples.
A schools costs are linear in the number of students and convex in quality. We
assume that the cost function is given by
c(ni; qi) =
1
2
niq
2
i
where ni is the number of students attending school i.
Finally, we assume that the peer group e¤ect provided by a school is determined
by its most able student. Formally, for two successive schools in the quality range with
qs < qr and s < S we have
gs = asr: (2)
For the highest quality school we have
gS = a:
Support for this specication of the peer group e¤ect has been provided in the introduc-
tion, where we report evidence that the peer group e¤ect is not of the linear in means
type.
There are two types of schools: private and public. Private schools maximize prots
s = nsts   c(ns; qs)
while public schools maximize (utilitarian) welfare. The precise writing of social welfare
for an arbitrary number of schools and allowing for all possible cases regarding corner
solutions for marginal students is rather tedious. In the remainder of the paper we
shall concentrate on the case of 2 or 3 schools and we restrict ourselves to providing the
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expressions for the well-behaved cases.3 With S = 2, q1 < q2 and a < a12 < a we
have
sw2 =
Z a12
a
[(1 + a)q1 + a12   1
2
q21]da+
Z a
a12
[(1 + a)q2 + a  1
2
q22]da: (3)
When there are 3 schools with q1 < q2 < q3 and a < a12 < a23 < a we have
sw3 =
Z a12
a
[(1 + a)q1 + a12   1
2
q21]da+
Z a23
a12
[(1 + a)q2 + a23   1
2
q22]da
+
Z a
a23
[(1 + a)q3 + a  1
2
q23]da: (4)
Schools compete in quality and tuition fees. We consider a two stage game in which
quality is chosen in the rst stage and tuition fees in the second stage. The solution
concept is the subgame perfect Nash equilibrium. A crucial element of this specication
(following from the requirement of subgame perfection) is that schools cannot commit
to tuition fees when choosing their qualities.
2.1 Optimal allocation
We start by determining the e¢ cient allocation which is an interesting benchmark. For
simplicity, we set (here and in the remainder of the paper) a = 0 and a = 1; this is
purely a matter of normalization and has no impact on the qualitative results. The
following proposition states the optimal allocation with 1, 2 or 3 schools.
Proposition 1 a)The optimal allocation with a given number of schools does not depend
on the peer group e¤ect parameter  and is given by
(i) q1 = 3=2 for S = 1;
(ii) (q1; q2) = (5=4; 7=4) and a12 = 1=2 for S = 2;
(iii) (q1; q2; q3) = (7=6; 3=2; 11=6) and (a12; a23) = (4=3; 5=3) for S = 3.
b) The tuition fees that decentralize this allocations satisfy
(i)
t2  
1
2
(q2)
2 = t1  
1
2
(q1)
2 + (1  a12) (5)
3We adopt this simplication for all our analytical expressions. However, the full expressions with
all relevant constraint are used in all the numerical solutions.
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for S = 2 and
(ii)
t2 
1
2
(q2)
2 = t1 
1
2
(q1)
2+(a23  a12) and t3 
1
2
(q3)
2 = t2 
1
2
(q2)
2+(1  a23):
for S = 3:
In words, di¤erences in tuition reect di¤erences in marginal cost and a Pigouvian
term.
Proof. We prove this proposition for the two school case. The solution with three
schools follows along the same lines. Di¤erentiating social welfare specied by (3) yields
@sw2
@q1
=
Z a12
0
[(1 + a)  q1]da = 0;
@sw2
@q1
=
Z 1
a12
[(1 + a)  q2]da = 0;
@sw2
@a12
= [(1 + a12)q1 + a12   1
2
q21]  [(1 + a12)q2 +  
1
2
q22] +
Z a12
0
[]da = 0:
Solving we obtain q1 = 1:25, q2 = 1:75 and a12 = 1:5. Note that with these values the
FOC with for a12 can be rewritten as
[(1 + a12)q1   1
2
q21]  [(1 + a12)q2  
1
2
q22] + (a12   1) +
Z a12
0
[]da = 0 (6)
when a12 = 1:5 the last two terms cancel out: (0:5) + 0:5 = 0. Now notice that
the rst two terms correspond to the di¤erence between the net social utilities of the
marginal individual when she attends school 1 and school 2 in the absence of peer group
e¤ects ( = 0), this term is equal to zero when a12 = 1:5, q1 = 1:25 and q2 = 1:75; the
two utilities are equal so that the rst two terms in brackets also cancel out.
To understand these results (as well as a number of arguments in the remainder of
the paper) one has to observe that each individual has a most preferredlevel of school
quality q(a). Formally dene
q(a) = argmax
q
(1 + a)q   1
2
q2 = 1 + a;
that is the quality level preferred by an individual with ability a, if tuition is set a
marginal cost (and disregarding peer group e¤ects). With a = 0 and a = 1, preferred
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qualities are then distributed over the interval [1; 2] and we can think about the problem
as one of optimal locationswithin this interval of preferred qualities.4 Without peer
group e¤ects it is then plain that one school should be locatedat the center of this
interval, two schools at the rst and fourth quarter, three schools at 1=6; 3=6 and 5=6; see
Figure 1. In other words, it is optimal to have schools of equal size each o¤ering a quality
which corresponds to the most preferred quality of its median student. Interestingly this
allocation remains optimal when peer group e¤ects are accounted for. To understand
this consider a marginal reallocation of students from a high quality to a low quality
school. We have then two e¤ects: on the one hand the reallocation increases the peer
group e¤ect of the low quality school, on the other hand it reduces the number of
students who benet from the high peer group e¤ect in the high quality school. In our
model, as a consequence of the uniform distribution of ability and the separability of
the peer group e¤ects these two e¤ects cancel each other out exactly. This argument
(along with expression (6)) shows that the second term on the RHS of (5) is e¤ectively
a Pigouvian term, measuring the marginal social damage of an individuals action.
The point is that when the marginal individual switches from school 1 to school 2 he
reduces the PGE of all students in school 1 by a total of
R a12
0 []da, which as we have
seen equals (1  a12) at the optimal solution.
The number of schools is taken as given throughout the paper. Nevertheless it is
interesting to consider the e¢ cient number of schools. This number depends on the
value of . In our model there are two main forces that determine the optimal number
of schools. On the one hand the higher is the number of schools, the better will be the
match between preferred and available qualities.5 On the other hand, the peer group
e¤ect pushes towards a low number of schools. From that perspective, a single school
performs best. For a = 0 and a = 1 one can check that if   1:125 it is e¢ cient
to have only one school. If  2 [0:069; 0:125] it is e¢ cient to have two school, and if
 2 [0:0486; 0:069] it is e¢ cient to have three schools.
4See Cremer and Thisse (1991).
5Fixed costs would also limit the optimal number of schools; they are ignored in our setting for
simplicty.
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a)
1 2ea12 = 1:5
xq1 = 1:25 xq2 = 1:75
b)
1 2ea12 = 1:33 ea23 = 1:67
xq1 = 1:17 xq2 = 1:50 xq3 = 1:83
Figure 1: E¢ cient allocations: a) two schools b) three schools. Black dots represent
schools localization and the double lines (jj) represent the most preferred quality of the
marginal students.
3 School competition without peer group e¤ects
We rst study school competition with two or three schools when there are no peer group
e¤ects. This provides a useful benchmark to assess the results with peer group e¤ects
derived below. We consider the possible congurations of mixed oligopolies, where each
of the schools can be either public or private. When there are no peer group e¤ects,
the various equilibria can be determined analytically. However, this implies long and
rather tedious derivations. We shall restrict our attention to the analytical arguments
which are useful for interpreting the results. For instance it is interesting to look at the
best-response functions of the di¤erent schools in the tuition subgame. For the rest, we
provide the numerical results.6
3.1 Analytical results
Recall that school play a two stage game which we solve by backward induction. Conse-
quently, we must rst solve the equilibrium of the second stage conditional on arbitrary
quality levels. We will rst derive the best-reply functions of private and public schools
6With the normalization a = 0 and a = 1 and when  = 0, the algebraic derivations will eventually
yield a numerical solution.
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located in positions 1, 2 and 3 (assuming q1 < q2 < q3). We concentrate on the case of
three schools; the expressions with two schools can be obtained as special cases from our
results.7 We will then use this reaction functions for the characterization of equilibria.
3.1.1 Tuition fee game
Private schools Using equation 1 with  = 0 prots of a private school when o¤ering
the lowest quality (q1) can be written as:
1 =

t2   t1
q2   q1   1

t1   1
2
q21

:
From the rst order condition with respect to t1 we can nd the best-reply in tuition
fee game which is a function of t2, q1 and q2:
t1 =
1
2
t2   1
2
(q2   q1) + 1
4
q21 (7)
If the private school o¤ers intermediate quality (q2) prots are given by
2 =

t3   t2
q3   q2   1

 

t2   t1
q2   q1   1

t2   1
2
q22

and the best reply in tuition fee game is given by
t2 =
t1(q3   q2) + t3(q2   q1)
2(q3   q1) +
1
4
q22
Finally, a private school that o¤ers the highest quality (q3) will have
3 =

1 

t3   t2
q3   q2   1

t3   1
2
q23

as prots and the best reply in the tuition fee game will be given by
t3 =
1
2
t2 + (q3   q2) + 1
4
q23 (8)
These expressions all have a familiar avor and are rather standard in vertical di¤eren-
tiation models.
7The expression for the low quality school remains the same. With S = 2 the high quality school is
indexed 2, but its best-response function is the same as that of school 3 with S = 3 (except that indexes
have to be changed in an approriate way).
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Public schools Public schools maximize social welfare which, with three schools, is
given by (9). Substituting for a12 and a23 from (1) yields
fsw3 = Z t2 t1q2 q1 1
0
[(1 + a)q1   1
2
q21]da+
Z t3 t2
q3 q2 1
t2 t1
q2 q1 1
[(1 + a)q2   1
2
q22]da
+
Z 1
t3 t2
q3 q2 1
[(1 + a)q3   1
2
q23]da: (9)
Di¤erentiating with respect to t1, setting equal to zero and solving we obtain
t1 = t2   1
2
 
q22   q21

: (10)
This equation implies
t1   1
2
q21 = t2  
1
2
q22;
so that the public school sets the same markup (above marginal cost) as the private
school to achieve the appropriate level of a12. When t1 is given by (10) we have
a12 =
1
2
(q22   q21)
q2   q1   1 =
(q1 + q2)
2
  1:
Consequently, the price is set to ensure that the marginal consumer has a preferred
quality which is exactly in the center of the interval [q1; q2]. Observe that we get
this result because with inelastic demand tuition fees are merely a transfer between
households and school. The only impact of tuition fees on welfare is via the marginal
consumer (the allocation of students to schools). The school with the highest quality
uses exactly the same rule so that
t3 = t2 +
1
2
(q23   q22):
Finally, a public school with intermediate quality (q2), maximizes welfare with re-
spect to t2 and the best-reply function is given by
t2 =
1
(q3   q2)

t1   q
2
1
2

(q3   q2) +

t2   q
2
2
2

(q2   q1)

+
q22
2
;
so that the markup of school 2 is a weighted average of the markups of the two other
schools. The intuition is the same as before. If the other schools have the same markup
the public school will match it to achieve an e¢ cient allocation of students. When
the other schools have di¤erent markups, this is not possible and it has to strike a
compromise between the two marginal consumers.
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3.1.2 Quality game and equilibrium
Using the best-reply functions above we can nd equilibrium tuition fees conditional
on the quality o¤ered by each of the three schools. This tuition fees can be used to
express (second stage equilibrium) prots or welfare as functions of qualities and then
determine the equilibrium quality levels. To illustrate this we present the full analytical
solution for one of the scenarios. This is the easiest case, yielding simple results and
the expression are useful to understand the underlying intuition.
Schools 1 and 3 are public In that case, the tuition fee equilibrium implies
t1   1
2
q21 = t2  
1
2
q22 = t3  
1
2
q23
whatever the location. We thus also have
a12 =
q1 + q2
2
  1 (11)
a23 =
q2 + q3
2
  1 (12)
More precisely, the equilibrium is obtained by solving
t1 = t2   1
2
(q22   q21)
t2 =
t1(q3   q2) + t3(q2   q1)
2(q3   q1) +
1
4
q22
t3 = t2 +
1
2
(q23   q22)
which yields
ti   q
2
i
2
=
1
2
[q1q2 + q2q3   q1q3]  1
2
q22 i = 1; 2; 3 (13)
Using these expressions we can express the prot of school 2 at the second stage equi-
librium as
21 =

1
2
(q1q2 + q2q3   q1q3)  1
2
q22
 
q1 + q3
2

:
Observe that the market share does not depend on q2. Di¤erentiating this expression
we obtain
@21
@q2
=

1
2
q1   q2 + 1
2
q3
 
q1 + q3
2

:
12
Setting to zero and solving yields
q2 =
q1 + q3
2
; (14)
which implies that the solution is e¢ cient, namely (q1; q2; q3) = (7=6; 3=2; 11=6). To see
this observe that from (14) q2 = 3=2 is the best reply to q1 = 7=6 and q3 = 11=6. As
to the public schools, it is plain that they do not want to deviate from this (e¢ cient)
allocation.
Other scenarios The other cases with two public schools (1 an 2 or 2 and 3) are
equally simple and also yield an e¢ cient solution. The other scenarios involve more
complex intermediate expressions, which are not very insightful. With our normaliza-
tion, the solutions are in any event numerical and are presented in the next section.
3.2 Numerical results
The results of the two school cases equilibria are shown in Table 1 and Figure 2. It is
well known from the product di¤erentiation literature that the private equilibrium is
not e¢ cient. To decrease the intensity of tuition competition, prot maximizing schools
will di¤erentiate their quality in an excessive way. The main message emerging from
our results is that the mixed oligopoly restores e¢ ciency. The equilibrium is the same
whether the public school o¤ers highest or lowest quality. This conclusion is perfectly
in line with the results obtained by Cremer Marchand and Thisse (1991) in a Hotelling
setting with quadratic transportation cost.
Table 2 and Figure 3 show the results with three schools. In this case we can see
that to restore e¢ ciency there need be two public schools. It is important to note that
in this case when there is only one public school the only possible equilibrium in which
there are three active schools (a12 di¤erent than 1 and a23 di¤erent than 2) involves the
public school o¤ering intermediate quality; similarly if there are two public schools the
only equilibria with three active schools involves the private school o¤ering intermediate
quality.
The main results of this section are summarized in the following proposition.
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E¢ cient Private olig. Mixed olig.
a12 0.5000 0.5000 0.5000
q1 1.2500 0.7500 1.2500
q2 1.7500 2.2500 1.7500
t1 - 1.0313 1.0313
t2 - 3.2813 1.7813
1 - 0.3750 0.1250
2 - 0.3750 0.1250
sw 1.1563 1.0313 1.1563
Table 1: Two schools without peer group e¤ect ( = 0)
a)
1 2ea12 = 1:5
xq1 = 0:75 xq2 = 2:25
b)
1 2ea12 = 1:5
xq1 = 1:25 hq2 = 1:75
Figure 2: Two schools without peer group e¤ects: a) private oligopoly and b) mixed
oligopoly. Black dots represent private schools and empty dots represent public schools;
the double lines (jj) represent the marginal students.
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Mixed oligopoly
E¢ cient Private olig. One public Two public
i=2 i=1,2
a12 0.3333 0.2708 0.3750 0.3333
a23 0.6667 0.7292 0.6250 0.6667
q1 1.1667 1.1250 1.2500 1.1667
q2 1.5000 1.5000 1.5000 1.5000
q3 1.8333 1.8750 1.7500 1.8333
t1 - 0.7344 0.8750 0.7917
t2 - 1.2109 1.2188 1.2361
t3 - 1.8594 1.6250 1.7917
1 - 0.0275 0.0352 0.0370
2 - 0.0394 0.0234 0.0370
3 - 0.0275 0.0352 0.0370
sw 1.1620 1.1610 1.1602 1.1620
Table 2: Three schools without peer group e¤ect ( = 0)
a)
1 2ea12 = 1:27 ea23 = 1:73
xq1 = 1:125 xq2 = 1:50 xq3 = 1:875
b)
1 2ea12 = 1:38ea23 = 1:63
xq1 = 1:25 h
q2 = 1:50
xq3 = 1:75
c)
1 2ea12 = 1:33 ea23 = 1:67
hq1 = 1:17 xq2 = 1:50 hq3 = 1:83
Figure 3: Three schools without peer group e¤ects: a) private oligopoly, b) mixed
oligopoly with one public school and c) mixed oligopoly with two public schools. Black
dots represent private schools and empty dots represent public schools; the double lines
(jj) represent the marginal students.
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Proposition 2 Assume that there are no peer-group-e¤ects ( = 0) and normalize
a = 0 and a = 1. We have:
a) with two schools (S = 2),
(i) the private duopoly with prot maximizing schools is ine¢ cient and given by (qep1 ; q
ep
2 ) =
(3=4; 9=4);
(ii)the mixed duopoly with one private and public school is e¢ cient whatever the relative
position of the public school (high or low quality).
b) with three schools (S = 3),
(i) the private oligopoly with prot maximizing schools is ine¢ cient and given by
(qep1 ; q
ep
2 ; q
ep
2 ) = (5=4; 6=4; 7=4);
(ii) the mixed oligopoly with one private and two public schools is e¢ cient whatever the
relative position of the public schools (high or low or intermediate quality)
(iii) a mixed equilibria (with positive market shares for all schools) with two private and
one public schools exist only when the public school o¤ers the intermediate quality. This
equilibrium is not e¢ cient and yields lower welfare than the private oligopoly.
4 School competition with peer group e¤ects
We now introduce peer group e¤ects and suppose that  > 0: Not surprisingly this
makes the analytical resolution of the model even more tiresome. There are however
some important conclusions that can be drawn from the best-reply functions in the
tuition fee game with two schools. We shall derive and discuss these expressions and
then turn to the numerical results obtained in the two and three school cases.
4.1 The tuition subgame with two schools
With two schools and our specication of peer group e¤ects, from (2) we have g1 = a12
and g2 = 1 and equation (1) specifying the marginal student simplies to.
a12 =
(t2   t1)  (q2   q1)  
q2   q1    : (15)
Not surprisingly, a12 decreases with ; the stronger the PGE, the larger will be ceteris
paribus the market share of the high quality school. As before the marginal student
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determines the demand of each school.
Private schools
A private school that o¤ers lowest quality (q1) will have prots
1 =

(t2   t1)  (q2   q1)  
q2   q1   
 
t1   q
2
1
2

:
Maximizing with respect to t1 yields the following best-reply
t1 =
1
2

q21
2
+ t2   (q2   q1)  

(16)
When the private school o¤ers the highest quality we have
2 =

1  (t2   t1)  (q2   q1)  
q2   q1   
 
t2   q
2
2
2

(17)
=

2(q2   q1)  (t2   t1)
q2   q1   
 
t2   q
2
2
2

(18)
and the best-reply function is given by
t2 =
1
2

q22
2
+ t1 + 2(q2   q1)

(19)
Interestingly, the best-reply of the high quality school does not depend on . This
property arises because the market share (and hence the prot) of the high quality
school is proportional to 1=(q2   q1   ), which is a constant in the pricing game; see
equation (18). Consequently, the best-reply is the same as in the absence of PGE.
The low quality school sets a tuition which decreases with . This does not come as a
surprise. The PGE reduces the market power of the low quality schools. Consequently,
it has to set a lower market than in the absence of PGE.
Public schools
When there are only two schools welfare is given by sw2 as dened by (3). Substituting
for a12 from (15), di¤erentiating with respect to tis and solving yields the following
best-reply functions:
t1 = t2   1
2
(q22   q21) 


(q2   q1) + (12q22   12q21)  3

[q2   q1   2] (20)
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for a low-quality public school and
t2 = t1 +
1
2
(q22   q21) +


(q2   q1) + (12q22   12q21)  3

[q2   q1   2] (21)
for a high-quality public school.8
In the case of public schools, both reaction functions depend on the intensity of the
PGE . When  = 0 we return to the expressions obtained without PGE which imply
that the public school sets the same markup as its private neighbor. When  > 0 public
schools no longer set the same markup as their private competitor; instead, they adjust
it to account for the PGE (whatever their relative position in the spectrum of qualities).
The sign of the second term in (20) and (21) is not unambiguous. However, when 
is su¢ ciently close to zero it is obviously positive. For larger levels of  this remains
true as long as q2   q1 > 2. Consequently, the PGE induces the high-quality school
to increase its markup and the low-quality school to decrease it. Recall that the prices
which implement the optimal allocation satisfy the same property, see expression (5).
Since the public school maximizes welfare, it will set prices to achieve the best possible
allocation of students between schools, considering qualities, costs and PGE. If the high
quality public school sets the same markup as its neighbor the marginal consumer will
be too small because no incentive is given to account for the PGE.
4.2 Numerical Results
Tables 3 and 4 and Figures 4 and 5 present the numerical results with two and three
school for  = 0:04 (a level of PGE for which it is e¢ cient to have 3 schools).9
With two schools gives extreme and ine¢ cient quality di¤erentiation like in the case
without PGE. However, the solution is no longer symmetric and both qualities are lower
than in the case without PGE. In other words, there appears to be substitution between
a school achieves for free (because of the PGE) and the conventional quality which
is costly. The introduction of a public school improves welfare but does not restore
8Footnote about existence, restriction on  etc. We know that we must have q2   q1 > 2 so that
the welfare maximization problem be convex. We can show that

(q2   q1) + ( 12q22   12q21)  3

> 0:
9 In some cases we found multiple equilibria; however one of the equilibrium was always Pareto
dominated, we report only the Pareto dominant equilibrium.
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E¢ cient Private olig. Mixed oligopoly
i=1 i=2
a12 0.5000 0.4906 0.4628 0.5372
q1 1.2500 0.7359 1.2314 1.2933
q2 1.7500 2.2359 1.7067 1.7686
t1 - 0.9871 0.9735 1.0702
t2 - 3.2434 1.6903 1.8193
1 - 0.3514 0.0997 0.1256
2 - 0.3788 0.1256 0.1182
sw 1.2260 1.1013 1.2260 1.2260
Table 3: Two schools with peer group e¤ect
e¢ ciency. The two mixed equilibria (school 1 or school 2 public) are di¤erent but
symmetricwith respect to 3=2 and they yield the same level K:of welfare.10
In the three school case we obtain also that the presence of PGE lowers the quality
levels of all schools in the private equilibrium. The mixed equilibrium no longer restores
e¢ ciency with two public schools. However, the equilibrium with two public schools
yields a higher level of welfare than the private oligopoly and the best outcome is
achieved when the public schools provides the extreme quality levels (index 1 and 3).
The mixed equilibria with a single public school give lower welfare than the private
oligopoly. Welfare depends on the position of the public school and the best (least
harmful) solution is when it provides the lowest quality. There exists no equilibrium
(yielding positive market shares for all schools) in which a high quality public school
competes with two private of lower quality.
The main results of this section are summarized in the following proposition.
Proposition 3 Assume that there are peer-group-e¤ects ( > 0) whose intensity is
determined by the most able student attending a given school. Normalize a = 0 and
a = 1. We have:
a) with two schools (S = 2),
(i) the private duopoly with prot maximizing schools is ine¢ cient and given by (qep1 ; q
ep
2 ) =
10Symmetryrefers to the property that the private school locateseither at 1:5+ 0:21 (when is is
of high quality) or at 1:5  0:21 (when it is of low quality). Similarly, the public school locates either at
1:5  0:27 or at 1:5 + 0:27.
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a)
1 2ea12 = 1:49
xq1 = 0:74 xq2 = 2:24
b)
1 2ea12 = 1:46
hq1 = 1:23 xq2 = 1:71
c)
1 2ea12 = 1:54
xq1 = 1:29 hq2 = 1:77
Figure 4: Two schools with peer group e¤ects: a) private oligopoly, b) mixed oligopoly,
school 1 is public and c) mixed oligopoly, school 2 is public. Black dots represent
private schools and empty dots represent public schools; the double lines (jj) represent
the marginal students.
Mixed olig.
E¢ cient Private olig. One public Two public
i=1 i=2 i=1,2 i=1,3 i=2,3
a12 0.3333 0.2053 0.5300 0.0499 0.2846 0.3956 1.2462
a23 0.6667 0.6826 0.7299 0.8078 0.5693 0.6985 1.6201
q1 1.1667 1.0424 1.2494 1.0216 1.1423 1.1877 1.1056
q2 1.5000 1.4067 1.3013 1.4300 1.4270 1.5848 1.4721
q3 1.8333 1.8233 1.7290 1.4780 1.7480 1.8750 .8339
t1 - 0.6099 0.7614 0.5403 0.7507 0.7313 0.6915
t2 - 1.0681 0.8488 0.9994 1.1278 1.2977 1.1632
t3 - 1.7818 1.5994 1.0937 1.6488 1.8025 1.7646
1 - 0.0137 -0.0101 0.0009 0.0280 0.0103 0.0198
2 - 0.0376 0.0004 -0.0175 0.0312 0.0127 0.0298
3 - 0.0379 0.0283 0.0003 0.0521 0.0135 0.0315
sw 1,2287 1.2271 1.2138 1.2031 1.2281 1.2282 1.2281
Table 4: Three schools with peer group e¤ect
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a)
1 2ea12 = 1:21 ea23 = 1:68
xq1 = 1:04 xq2 = 1:41 xq3 = 1:82
b)
1 2ea12 = 1:53ea23 = 1:73
hq1 = 1:25x
q2 = 1:30
xq3 = 1:73
c)
1 2ea12 = 1:05 ea23 = 1:81
xq1 = 1:02 h
q2 = 1:43
xq3 = 1:48
d)
1 2ea12 = 1:28 ea23 = 1:57
hq1 = 1:14 h
q2 = 1:42
xq3 = 1:75
e)
1 2ea12 = 1:40ea23 = 1:70
hq1 = 1:19 x
q2 = 1:59
hq3 = 1:87
f)
1 2ea12 = 1:25 ea23 = 1:62
xq1 = 1:11 h
q2 = 1:47
hq3 = 1:83
Figure 5: Three schools and peer group e¤ects: a) private oligopoly, b) mixed oligopoly,
school 1 is public, c) mixed oligopoly, school 2 is public, d) mixed oligopoly, schools 1 and
2 are public, e) mixed oligopoly, schools 1 and 3 are public and f) mixed oligopoly, schools
2 and 3 are public. Black dots represent private schools and empty dots represent public
schools; the double lines (jj) represent the marginal students.21
(0:74; 2:24); both qualities are lower than in the absence of PGE
(ii) the mixed duopoly with one private and public school is no longer e¢ cient. Equilib-
rium qualities depend on the relative position of the public school (high or low quality)
but welfare does not.
b) with three schools (S = 3),
(i) the private oligopoly with prot maximizing schools is ine¢ cient and given by
(qep1 ; q
ep
2 ; q
ep
2 ) = (1:04; 1:41; 1:82) and all qualities are lower than in the absence of PGE.
(ii) the mixed oligopoly with one private and two public schools is no longer e¢ cient.
However, welfare is higher than in the private equilibrium and is highest when the public
school provides an extreme quality level (index 1 or 3).
(iii) a mixed equilibria (with positive market shares for all schools) with two private and
one public schools exist only when the public school o¤ers the low or the intermediate
quality (index 1 or 2). This equilibrium is not e¢ cient and yields lower welfare than
the private oligopoly.
Finally, the comparison of Propositions 2 and 3 suggests that the presence of PGE
reduces the e¤ectiveness of public schools as regulatory tool in an otherwise private
education sector. This may come as a surprise because PGE generate externalities which
could be expected to enhance the case for public intervention. However, an e¤ective
public intervention has to rely on the appropriate instrument(s). And the lesson that
emerges from our result is that the mere presence of public (welfare maximizing) schools
may not be su¢ cient. As a matter of fact, in the absence of commitment, they may
e¤ectively be detrimental to social welfare. While this phenomenon can also occur in
the absence of PGE, it appears to be exacerbated by the PGE.
5 Summary and concluding remarks
This paper has studied mixed oligopoly equilibria with private and public schools. We
have examined how the equilibrium allocation (qualities, tuition fees and welfare) is
a¤ected by the presence of public schools and by their relative position in the quality
range. We have studied these questions without and with PGE. The peer group e¤ect
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for any given school is determined by its student with the highest ability. PGE were
shown to have a signicant e¤ect on the various equilibria we consider. When there are
no peer group e¤ects, e¢ ciency is achieved when (at least) all but one school are public.
In particular, in the two school case, the impact of a public school is spectacular as we go
from a setting of extreme di¤erentiation to an e¢ cient allocation. However, in the three
school case, a single public school will lower welfare compared to the private equilibrium.
More complex results have emerged with PGE. In that case the mixed equilibrium is
never e¢ cient. However, welfare continues to be improved if all but one school are
public. Overall, the presence of PGE reduces the e¤ectiveness of public schools as
regulatory tool in an otherwise private education sector. As a matter of fact, in the
absence of commitment, they may e¤ectively be detrimental to social welfare. While
this phenomenon can also occur in the absence of PGE, it appears to be exacerbated
by the PGE. This may come as a surprise because PGE generate externalities which
could be expected to enhance the case for public intervention. However, an e¤ective
public intervention has to rely on the appropriate instrument(s). And the lesson that
has emerged from our result is that the mere presence of public schools may not be
su¢ cient. The analysis is of great practical relevance since in many countries with
mixed education markets, regulatory tools are limited to the introduction of public
institutions. To achieve a more e¢ cient outcome, additional tools would be required to
correct for the ine¢ ciencies brought about by the externalities.
Our analysis has ignored a number of important features of education markets.
Probably the most important is wealth heterogeneity. If this aspect were introduced
the assumption that the entire market is covered in any scenario would also become
rather unacceptable. We leave this issue for future research. Note, however, that this
feature would not render the current paper redundant. It would require an admittedly
nontrivial generalization, though. Either way, our nding that the simple presence of
public schools (even when they are welfare maximizing) may be counterproductive and
is in any event not su¢ cient to eradicate the ine¢ ciencies that arise in a decentralized
education market with PGE can only be reinforced. Additional instruments are needed
and the assessment of their respective roles will be an even more challenging issue under
23
heterogeneity.
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